The English (Association) Football League is a long established industrial cartel selling a highly popular product with only imperfect substitutes. Despite that, the majority of its member clubs lose money and the industry has faced successive financial crises over the last decade. This paper develops an empirical model of the financial performance of English League clubs suing a high quality dataset of 48 clubs over the period 1974-89. The underlying model explains how rents are competed away through the maximising behaviour of club owners subject to production constraints. This model is parameterised by a system of equations which describe the behaviour of a maximising owner subject to demand and production constraints. The model is then used to examine the coordination failure which lies at the heart of the English Football League's decline and to assess the prospects for the Premier League. Copyright 1997 by Taylor and Francis Group
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Volume (Year): 11 (1997) Issue (Month): 1 (January) Pages: 135-53 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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