Firms in the LDCs need to adopt and indigenize transferred technology before usage. The adoption costs depend on the state of the infrastructure and on the localized spillover effects generated by a rival firm. In this context, the paper examines the timing of such technological adoption. It shows that strategic decisions regarding time may result in a "waiting game” where, in equilibrium, the efficient firm prefers to adopt after its less efficient rival, thus delaying the speed of technology transfer. The paper also shows that under certain conditions, technology transfer may not take place within the planning horizon. [01, L1, F1]
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 8 (1994) Issue (Month): 4 (December) Pages: 1-14 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: