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On Shibata'S Negation Of Lump-Sum Transfers In Global Warming Control

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Author Info
ROBERT E. KOHN
Abstract

When all countries tax domestic emissions of a pure global pollutant at a rate equal to global marginal damage, some of these countries - typically, developing countries - are likely to be worse off. To win the cooperation of such developing countries, it is often advocated that they receive lump-sum compensation from the industrialized countries. To the contrary, Shibata (1996, p.298) argues that it is "not possible to make developing countries any better off by lump-sum transfers of the [tax] revenues.” This pessimistic outlook is challenged in the present paper, which reaffirms the case for international lump-sum transfers. [F02, H23, Q23, Q25]

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Article provided by Korean International Economic Association in its journal International Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 17 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 29-41
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Handle: RePEc:taf:intecj:v:17:y:2003:i:1:p:29-41

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  1. Adam Rose & Brandt Stevens & Jae Edmonds & Marshall Wise, 1998. "International Equity and Differentiation in Global Warming Policy," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(1), pages 25-51, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Deacon, R.T. & Murphy, P., 1994. "The Structure of an Environmental Transaction: The Debt-for-Nature Swap," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 15-92_r, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
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  3. Robert Kohn, 1995. "Salvatore model with equiproportional preservation of forests," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 63-79, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Kahn, James R. & McDonald, Judith A., 1995. "Third-world debt and tropical deforestation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 107-123, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Chambers, Paul E. & Jensen, Richard & Whitehead, John C., 1996. "Debt-for-nature swaps as noncooperative outcomes," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 135-146, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Robert N. Stavins, 1999. "The Costs of Carbon Sequestration: A Revealed-Preference Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 994-1009, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Michael Hoel & Kerstin Schneider, 1997. "Incentives to participate in an international environmental agreement," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 9(2), pages 153-170, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Matthews, Stephen & O'Connor, Raymond & Plantinga, Andrew J., 2002. "Quantifying the impacts on biodiversity of policies for carbon sequestration in forests," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 71-87, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Chambers, Paul & Kohn, Robert E, 2001. "Environmental Barriers to Trade: The Case of Endangered Sea Turtles," Review of International Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(1), pages 123-32, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Kohn, Robert E., 2001. "Unilateral transfer of abatement capital," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 85-95, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Shibata, Hirofumi, 1971. "A Bargaining Model of the Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(1), pages 1-29, Jan.-Feb.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Hansen, Stein, 1989. "Debt for nature swaps -- Overview and discussion of key issues," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 77-93, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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