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Equilibrium Contracts In A Bilateral Monopoly With Unequal Bargaining Powers

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Author Info
SIDDHARTHA DASGUPTA
STEPHEN DEVADOSS
Abstract

Real-world bilateral monopolies often indicate that one party exercise slightly superior bargaining power than the other party. We analyze long-term, cooperative contracts in bilateral monopolies with unequal bargaining powers. We assume that the two parties bargain for a determinate price and quantity of the intermediate product by optimizing a joint objective which takes into account the profits and bargaining power of each party. We use a Bowley price leadership model to develop the multi-period contracts and derive conditions that induce a Nash equilibrium at the jointly determined points of operation. [C71, C78]

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Article provided by Korean International Economic Association in its journal International Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 16 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 43-71
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Handle: RePEc:taf:intecj:v:16:y:2002:i:1:p:43-71

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  1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Alvin E Roth, 2008. "Axiomatic Models of Bargaining," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000002376, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Stephen Devadoss & Kevin Cooper, 2000. "Simultaneous Price And Quantity Determination In A Joint Profit Maximizing Bilateral Monopoly Under Dynamic Optimization," International Economic Journal, Korean International Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 71-84, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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