This paper examines how a capital-exporting country should tax foreign investment income when saving is variable and the goal is to maximize globle welfare. Other recent studies have assumed either that countries cooperate to achieve this goal, or that they act unilaterally to maximize the national benefit. The present paper returns to the framework used by earlier authors, in which the capital-exporting country acts unilaterally and takes foreign tax rates as given. Unlike the previous studies, it is found that if the capital-exporting country's investments do not alter foreign rates of return, the optimal tax stucture may involve higher taxes for foreign than for domestic investment income. [H21, H87]
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Volume (Year): 14 (2000) Issue (Month): 4 (December) Pages: 77-86 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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