Optimal trade sanctions will typically be non-prohibitive. The maximum penalty of a total trade embargo may not be desired or warranted and non-prohibitive sanctions may strike the best balance between punishing the target and avoiding damage to the sanctioner. Non-prohibitive sanctions can also: reduce smuggling, lessen the benefits to bystander countries, and mitigate the harm to innocent communities within the target country. When there are domestic distortions within the target country, non-prohibitive sanctions may be more painful than prohibitive sanctions. The possibility of easing non-prohibitive sanctions in response to reform also provides an appropriate incentive. [F13, K3]
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: