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Analysis of Cartel Duration: Evidence from EC Prosecuted Cartels

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Author Info

  • Oindrila De

Abstract

This study first analyses the life span of the cartels convicted by the European Commission during 1990-2008 and explores certain issues regarding the empirical definition of cartel duration. The cross-section analysis then investigates the determinants of cartel break up using a competing risk Cox proportional hazard model. The result shows that external disturbances and changes in the cartels' own structures play a crucial role in cartel demise. Moreover, the cartel members' ability to enforce their agreement through better organization also dictates its success. The analysis also reveals that when a leniency regime is in operation, cartels tend to be more fragile.

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File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/13571510903516946
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal International Journal of the Economics of Business.

Volume (Year): 17 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 33-65

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Handle: RePEc:taf:ijecbs:v:17:y:2010:i:1:p:33-65

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Related research

Keywords: Cartels; Duration Analysis; External Disturbances; EU Leniency Policy; Cartel Enforcement;

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Cited by:
  1. Zhou, J., 2012. "Endogenous Lysine Strategy Profile and Cartel Duration: An Instrumental Variables Approach," Discussion Paper 2012-009, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
  2. Zhou, Jun, 2011. "Evaluating Leniency with Missing Information on Undetected Cartels: Exploring Time-Varying Policy Impacts on Cartel Duration," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 353, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  3. Joan Ramón Borrell & Juan Luís Jiménez & Carmen García, 2012. "Evaluating antitrust leniency programs," Working Papers XREAP2012-01, Xarxa de Referència en Economia Aplicada (XREAP), revised Jan 2012.

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