Justifying Human Rights: Economics and the Individual
AbstractThis paper examines the relationship between the individual conception in economics and the justification of economic rights as human rights. It briefly describes the nature of economic rights, and argues that the Homo economicus conception constitutes a barrier to justifying them. The paper then offers an alternative conception of the individual as socially embedded, and argues that it offers an adequate basis for the justification of economic rights. On this alternative conception individuals are enduring beings who have personal identities.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Forum for Social Economics.
Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Other versions of this item:
- John Davis, 2009. "Justifying Human Rights: Economics and the Individual," Forum for Social Economics, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 79-89, April.
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- John B Davis & Solange Regina Marin, 2009. "Identity and Democracy: Linking individual and social reasoning," Development, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 52(4), pages 500-508, December.
- Shareen Hertel & Lanse Minkler, 2007. "Economic Rights: The Terrain," Economic Rights Working Papers 1, University of Connecticut, Human Rights Institute.
- Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, 2002. "Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(2), pages 351-401, June.
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