This paper deals with the problem of simultaneity between the firm's investments and financial structure in the context of dynamic optimization where the process of information spreading that associates the profitability of the firm to its share price only takes part gradually, due to market imperfections and diverging incentives between shareholders and managers. In particular, the latter are assumed to hold the control of the firm and decide upon the allocation of its cash-flow. This creates a link between cash-flow and rate of discount of profits, generating a 'financial channel of transmission’ of the real shocks.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 11 (2005) Issue (Month): 3 (June) Pages: 247-258 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1990.
"Macroeconomic Models with Equity and Credit Rationing,"
NBER Chapters,
in: Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, pages 15-42
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: