Individual utility in a context of asymmetric sensitivity to pleasure and pain: an interpretation of Bentham's felicific calculus
Abstract
This paper aims at exploring, in a formal way, Bentham's statement that 'the pleasure of gaining is not equal to the evil of losing', which belongs to those aspects of the principle of utility left aside by Jevons' reconstruction. Consequently, the agent's preference order will be viewed as depending on his initial situation, and on asymmetric sensitivity to gains and losses, relative to this situation. This leads 1) to discuss the coexistence of multiple preference orders, illustrated by Bentham's analysis of the optimal labour contract; and 2) to introduce true deliberation as a consequence of the gap between positive choice and rival assessments of utility.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought.
Volume (Year): 7 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 45-78
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Related research
Keywords: Bentham Endogeneous Preferences Individual Utility Pain And Pleasure Preference Reversal Utilitarianism;Other versions of this item:
- André Lapidus & Nathalie Sigot, 2000. "Individual Utility in a Context of Asymetric Sensitivity to Pleasure and Pain: An Interpretation of Bentham's Felicific Calculus," Post-Print hal-00344899, HAL.
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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""Be Quiet" mais modérement : le rôle de l'Etat dans la pensée économique de Jeremy Bentham,"
Post-Print
hal-00578352, HAL.
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- A. Baujard, 2006. "From moral welfarism to technical non-welfarism : A step back to Bentham’s felicific calculus of its members," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 200606, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
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