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Who bets against hedgers and how much they trade? A theory and empirical tests

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  • Bing-Xuan Lin
  • Chen-Miao Lin
  • Stephen Smith

Abstract

This article provides a simple equilibrium model of a futures market. Since the futures market is a zero sum game, some firms will, in equilibrium, end up being 'speculators' who bet against 'hedgers'. We show it is firms that have high initial capital and/or poor production opportunities that are the most likely candidates to bet against the hedgers. In equilibrium, these groups earn a premium in order to provide this insurance so that speculating increases value. We also provide some results that imply an inverted U shaped relationship between trading volume and the level of futures prices. Empirical evidence from the S&P futures contract provides strong empirical support for this theoretical result.

Suggested Citation

  • Bing-Xuan Lin & Chen-Miao Lin & Stephen Smith, 2009. "Who bets against hedgers and how much they trade? A theory and empirical tests," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(27), pages 3491-3497.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:41:y:2009:i:27:p:3491-3497
    DOI: 10.1080/00036840701493766
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