The effect of performance on corporate disclosure: an empirical study of Taiwan banks
AbstractThis study addresses bank performance and its effect on disclosure practices. Results show that better-performing banks are less likely to disclose information on their corporate governance practices possibly because of their desire to avoid the two-audience signalling problem. In addition, large and highly leveraged banks tend to disclose more; the former may wish to alleviate public criticism or government interference in their affairs, while the latter may wish to minimize their agency costs of debt. This study also extends previous work by exploring an empirical exposition of the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve analysis, and thus provides compelling evidence on the reliability and robustness of the model.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Applied Financial Economics.
Volume (Year): 20 (2010)
Issue (Month): 24 ()
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Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/RAFE20
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