This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Substitutes versus complements among credit risk management tools

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Matthew M. Sackett
Sherrill Shaffer

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Practitioners, regulators and researchers have long recognized important conceptual distinctions among screening, monitoring and collection of loans. However, virtually no empirical studies have explored whether these tools of risk management are employed as net substitutes or as net complements. This paper finds evidence that, across the US banking industry, screening and monitoring behave as net substitutes but collection is complementary to screening and monitoring. A subset of low-risk banks suggests that best practices may involve net substitutability between each pair of these tools and, further, that any weakness in screening is fully offset by strength in monitoring and vice versa.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/link.asp?target=contribution&id=J15856N4257T4773
File Format: text/html
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Applied Financial Economics.

Volume (Year): 16 (2006)
Issue (Month): 14 (October)
Pages: 1007-1017
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:taf:apfiec:v:16:y:2006:i:14:p:1007-1017

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/routledge/09603107.html

Order Information:
Web: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/subscription.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Allen N. Berger & Loretta J. Mester, 1997. "Inside the Black Box: What Explains Differences in the Efficiencies of Financial Institutions?," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 97-04, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Manove, Michael & Padilla, A Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 2001. "Collateral versus Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(4), pages 726-44, Winter.
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 1000 journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2010-1-1.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.