Internal corporate governance mechanisms and corporate performance: evidence for UK firms
AbstractThis study investigates the relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms and corporate performance for a large sample of UK firms. The aim is to extend the existing literature on firm performance by empirically investigating the role of debt-maturity structure of firms and managerial compensation in affecting corporate performance. Also, the study attempts to provide new insights on the subject by considering potential interaction effects between managerial ownership and other governance mechanisms available to firms. The results support the existence of a non-linear impact of both managerial ownership and managerial compensation on company performance. Debt-maturity structure is also found to be significantly related to performance. Finally, there is strong evidence that managerial ownership and managerial compensation work as substitute mechanisms in mitigating agency problems and, therefore, generating good performance.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Applied Financial Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 1 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/RAFL20
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Chrisostomos Florackis, 2008. "Agency costs and corporate governance mechanisms: evidence for UK firms," International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 4(1), pages 37-59, January.
- Ozkan, Aydin & Ozkan, Neslihan, 2004. "Corporate cash holdings: An empirical investigation of UK companies," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(9), pages 2103-2134, September.
- Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
- Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
- Marc Goergen & Luc Renneboog, 1999. "Strong Managers and Passive Institutional Investors in the UK," Working Papers 1999.21, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Florackis, Chrisostomos & Kostakis, Alexandros & Ozkan, Aydin, 2009. "Managerial ownership and performance," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 62(12), pages 1350-1357, December.
- Chrisostomos Florackis & Aydin Ozkan, 2006. "What Reduces the Impact of Managerial Entrenchment on Agency Costs? Evidence for UK Firms," Discussion Papers 06/03, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Cristina Boþa-Avram, 2012. "Managerial Ownership, Board Structure And Firm’S Performance: A Review Of Main Findings," CES Working Papers, Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, vol. 4, pages 648-656, December.
- Marco Allegrini & Giulio Greco, 2013. "Corporate boards, audit committees and voluntary disclosure: evidence from Italian Listed Companies," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 187-216, February.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.