This paper investigates the extent to which the linkages between bank performance and governance structure affect deposits market competition and risk taking incentives when commercial banks compete with organizations with objectives different from profit maximization. These organizations include savings banks whose corporate and ownership structure yields an objective function that can incorporate labour expenses. It is found that such objective function enables the savings banks to capture a greater market share of bank deposits and to take on relatively less risk in their portfolio of investments. The empirical evidence from the Spanish retail banking sector documents these conclusions.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 1 (2005) Issue (Month): 1 (January) Pages: 37-40 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF