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A Delegated Agent in a Winner-Takes-All Contest

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Author Info
Schoonbeek, Lambert

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Abstract

A standard winner-takes-all rent-seeking contest with a principal-agent relationship is extended. One of the two players offers a contract to an agent to act as a delegate on his behalf. The wage offered to the agent is deliberately chosen. The equilibrium of the extended contest is characterized. Copyright 2002 by Taylor and Francis Group

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Article provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Applied Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 9 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 21-23
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Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:9:y:2002:i:1:p:21-23

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  1. Oliver Gürtler, 2006. "Contractual Incentive Provision and Commitment in Rent-Seeking Contests," Discussion Papers 100, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Matthias Kräkel & Dirk Sliwka, 2002. "Strategic Delegation and Mergers in Oligopolistic Contests," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse2_2002, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Matthias Kräkel, 2002. "Delegation and strategic incentives for managers in contests," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(8), pages 461-470. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-9-16.

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