A delegated agent in a winner-takes-all contest
AbstractA standard winner-takes-all rent-seeking contest with a principal-agent relationship is extended. One of the two players offers a contract to an agent to act as a delegate on his behalf. The wage offered to the agent is deliberately chosen. The equilibrium of the extended contest is characterized.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Applied Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 9 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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