The effects of a recipient's gender in a modified dictator game
AbstractIn the two-person dictator game, player A (allocator) chooses how to split a given sum of money with player B (recipient). Player B has no power in terms of either accepting or rejecting payer A's offer. This paper investigates the gender dynamics within the four possible dyads in a modified Dictator game. Both men and women gave more money to women. In other words, contrary to other studies that have investigated dictator game behaviour, the current study finds a main effect for the recipient's gender (rather than for the allocator's gender).
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Applied Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 8 (2001)
Issue (Month): 7 ()
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- Gad Saad & Tripat Gill, 2001. "Sex Differences in the Ultimatum Game: An Evolutionary Psychology Perspective," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 171-193, May.
- Nicolas Eber, 2006. "Les sportifs sont-ils (vraiment) différents ?. Une approche par l'économie expérimentale," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(3), pages 623-633.
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