Efficiency of internal capital market under a controlling-minority-shareholder structure
AbstractWe examine the efficiency of the internal capital market under three alternative ownership structures -- the dispersed ownership, the concentrated ownership and the Controlling-Minority-Shareholder (CMS) structure. Although the highest efficiency is achieved under the concentrated ownership, our analysis shows that the efficiency is higher under the CMS structure than under the dispersed ownership. The efficiency gain is greater if the agency problem between shareholders and the Headquarter (HQ) manager is greater. The conclusion of the analysis is in line with the observed patterns of firm organization in developing economies.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Applied Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 19 (2012)
Issue (Month): 18 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/routledge/13504851.html
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.