Collusion, competition and piracy
AbstractIn this article we analyse firms' ability to tacitly collude on prices in an infinitely repeated duopoly game of vertical product differentiation. We show that firms collude if and only if their discount factor is high enough, that is, if they value future profits sufficiently. We also show that a lower cost of copying facilitates collusion but that a higher quality of the copy hinders collusion. Thus, the overall effect of these new characteristics of copies made by consumers is ambiguous.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Applied Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 18 (2011)
Issue (Month): 11 ()
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Web page: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/routledge/13504851.html
Other versions of this item:
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property Rights
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Piracy and competition,"
Discussion Papers (ECON - DÃ©partement des Sciences Economiques)
2005057, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
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- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:6:y:2003:i:10:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS
- Peitz, Martin & Waelbroeck, Patrick, 2006. "Piracy of digital products: A critical review of the theoretical literature," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 449-476, November.
- Hackner, Jonas, 1994. "Collusive pricing in markets for vertically differentiated products," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 155-177, June.
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