On the Athey-Levin model of skewed bidding
AbstractUsing data from 39 first-price, sealed-bid auctions from three Wisconsin State forests, we examine the fragility of the sealed-bid auction portion of Athey and Levin's (2001) study of skewed bidding behaviour in US forest service auctions. The results of our analysis compare favourably with their results, suggesting that their model is robust across data sets similar to, but distinct from, the data used in their study.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Applied Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 17 (2010)
Issue (Month): 8 ()
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