Fair Redistribution In Financial Markets: A Game Theory Complete Analysis
AbstractThe aim of this paper is to propose a methodology to stabilize the financial markets using Game Theory and in particular the Complete Study of a Differentiable Game, introduced in the literature by David Carfi. Specifically, we will focus on two economic operators: a real economic subject and a financial institute (a bank, for example) with a big economic availability. For this purpose we will discuss about an interaction between the two above economic subjects: the Enterprise, our first player, and the Financial Institute, our second player. The only solution which allows both players to win something, and therefore the only one desirable, is represented by an agreement between the two subjects: the Enterprise artificially causes an inconsistency between spot and future markets, and the Financial Institute, who was unable to make arbitrages alone, because of the introduction by the normative authority of a tax on economic transactions (that we propose to stabilize the financial market, in order to protect it from speculations), takes the opportunity to win the maximum possible collective (social) sum, which later will be divided with the Enterprise by contract.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ASERS Publishing in its journal Journal of Advanced Studies in Finance.
Volume (Year): II (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.asers.eu/journals/jasf.html
financial markets and institutions; financing policy; financial risk; financial crises; game theory; arbitrages; coopetition.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
- N2 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Carfì, David, 2009. "Reactivity in decision-form games," MPRA Paper 29001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Carfì, David & Ricciardello, Angela, 2011. "Mixed extensions of decision-form games," MPRA Paper 28971, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Carfí, David & Musolino, Francesco, 2014. "Speculative and hedging interaction model in oil and U.S. dollar markets with financial transaction taxes," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 306-319.
- Carfì, David & Fici, Caterina, 2012.
"The government-taxpayer game,"
38506, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- David CARFI & Caterina FICI, 2012. "The Government-Taxpayer Game," Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Fields, ASERS Publishing, vol. 0(1), pages 13-25, June.
- Carfì, David & Musolino, Francesco, 2012. "Game theory model for European government bonds market stabilization: a saving-State proposal," MPRA Paper 39742, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Schilirò, Daniele & Carfì, David, 2013. "Coopetitive game solutions for the Greek crisis," MPRA Paper 43578, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- David, Carfì & Daniele, SCHILIRO', 2014. "Improving competitiveness and trade balance of Greek economy: a coopetitive strategy model," MPRA Paper 55124, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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