Prohibition Of Parallel Imports As A Hard Core Restriction Of Article 4 Of Block Exception Regulation For Vertical Agreements: European Law And Economics
AbstractThis paper attempts to highlight the main principles of Competition Law (regulatory and case law framework) covering the prohibition of parallel imports and to reveal the main effects of it on the competitive structure of the market. Especially, the regulatory framework relates Block Exception Regulation 330/2010 with Block Exception Regulation 461/2010 in order to determine whether prohibition of parallel imports constitutes a hardcore restriction or not, while the economic analysis evaluates it in a vertical market with few suppliers & buyers which sell goods to the final (domestic) consumers. The results indicate that the prohibition of parallel imports by upstream sellers cause vertical restraints to the domestic customers of the buyers. In any case, this paper focusing mainly on consumer welfare, does not necessarily link parallel imports with the notion of parallel trade and/or parallel exports as well as it does not provide the pros and cons of parallel trade.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ASERS Publishing in its journal Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics.
Volume (Year): II (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
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Web page: http://www.asers.eu/journals/jarle.html
Antitrust Law; vertical restraints; block exception regulation; market imperfection; consumer nondurables; repeated games of Oligopoly Theory.;
Other versions of this item:
- Zevgolis, Nikolaos & Fotis, Panagiotis, 2011. "Prohibition of parallel Imports as a hard core Restriction of Article 4 of Block Exception Regulation for vertical Agreements: European Law and Economics," MPRA Paper 32870, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L67 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Other Consumer Nondurables
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Melinda Acutt & Caroline Elliott, 2001. "Threat-Based Competition Policy," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 309-317, May.
- Panagiotis Fotis & Michael Polemis & Nikolaos Zevgolis, 2011. "Robust Event Studies for Derogation from Suspension of Concentrations in Greece during the Period 1995–2008," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 67-89, March.
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