Injury Investigations in Antidumping and the Super-Additivity Effect: A Theoretical Explanation
AbstractEmpirical evidence shows that injury investigations in anti-dumping cases conducted by the United States International Trade Commission, the probability of a positive finding is higher when the number of defendant firms is larger, holding constant their total market share. In this paper we offer a theoretical explanation of this finding. We show that the presence of many exporters exacerbates the free-rider problem, which leads every firm to invest less on defense. Thus for the same market share, injury finding is more likely to be positive for many small sellers than a few large sellers.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of World Economics.
Volume (Year): 142 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Hindenburgufer 66, D-24105 Kiel
Phone: +49 431 8814-1
Fax: +49 431 8814528
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10290/index.htm
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Poonam Gupta & Arvind Panagariya, 2001. "Injury Investigations in Anti-Dumping and the Super-Additivity Effect: A Theoretical Explanation," IMF Working Papers 01/110, International Monetary Fund.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bruce A. Blonigen & Stephen E. Haynes, 1999. "Antidumping Investigations and the Pass-Through of Exchange Rates and Antidumping Duties," NBER Working Papers 7378, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- James A. Brander & Paul Krugman, 1983.
"A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade,"
NBER Working Papers
1194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brander, James & Krugman, Paul, 1983. "A 'reciprocal dumping' model of international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3-4), pages 313-321, November.
- James Brander & Paul Krugman, 1982. "A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade," Working Papers 513, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- James Brander & Paul Krugman, 1980. "A "Reciprocal Dumping" Model of International Trade," Working Papers 405, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Staiger, Robert W. & Wolak, Frank A., 1992.
"The effect of domestic antidumping law in the presence of foreign monopoly,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 32(3-4), pages 265-287, May.
- Staiger, R.W. & Wolak, F.A., 1990. "The Effec Of Domestic Antidumping Law In The Presence Of Foreign Monopoly," Working Papers e-90-8, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
- Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1990. "The Effect of Domestic Antidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopoly," NBER Working Papers 3254, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- P. Tharakan & David Greenaway & Joe Tharakan, 1998.
"Cumulation and injury determination of the European community in antidumping cases,"
Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv),
Springer, vol. 134(2), pages 320-339, June.
- P.K.M. Tharakan & David Greenaway & Joe Tharakan,, . "Cumulation and Injury Determination of the European Community in Anti-Dumping Cases," Discussion Papers 97/17, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
- Rodrik, Dani, 1986. "Tariffs, subsidies, and welfare with endogenous policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3-4), pages 285-299, November.
- Wendy L. Hansen & Thomas J. Prusa, 1996.
"Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater Than the Whole,"
Departmental Working Papers
199422, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Hansen, Wendy L & Prusa, Thomas J, 1996. "Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts Is Greater Than the Whole," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(4), pages 746-69, October.
- Wendy L. Hansen & Thomas J. Prusa, 1995. "Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater thanthe Whole," NBER Working Papers 5062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert Staiger & Frank Wolak, 1994.
"Measuring Industry Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States,"
- Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1994. "Measuring Industry Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States," NBER Working Papers 4696, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Arvind Panagariya & Dani Rodrik, 1991.
"Political-Economy Arguments for a Uniform Tariff,"
NBER Working Papers
3661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Anderson, James E., 1993.
"Domino dumping II: Anti-dumping,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 133-150, August.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.