Corporate merger, organizational form, and control of labor
AbstractThis paper shows that, when two firms merge, the increase in the bargaining strength of the multiproduct firm arising from the merger when negotiating uniform wages with the workers is one of the reasons that account for corporate mergers. Moreover, there is a strategic variable that can be used to decrease union rents in the case of merging, namely, the organization of production decisions.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Spanish Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 2 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
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- Symeonidis, George, 2010.
"Downstream merger and welfare in a bilateral oligopoly,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 230-243, May.
- George Symeonidis, 2009. "Downstream merger and welfare in a bilateral oligopoly," Economics Discussion Papers 671, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Barcena-Ruiz, Juan Carlos, 2003. "Politically preferred wage bargaining structures," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 341-353, June.
- Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Straume, Odd Rune & Sørgard, Lars, 2002.
"Downstream merger with oligopolistic input suppliers,"
Discussion Papers, various Research Units
FS IV 01-22, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Kjell Erik Lommerud & Odd Rune Straume & Lars Sørgard, 2002. "Downstream Merger with Oligopolistic Input Suppliers," CESifo Working Paper Series 733, CESifo Group Munich.
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