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Plural identities and preference formation

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  • C. Binder

Abstract

This article explores under what conditions an agent can derive a transitive all-things-considered preference from a plurality of non-comparable objectives, values or judgements mirroring her plural identity. In contrast to existing contributions, the multiple values are reflected by partial (viz. incomplete) orderings. It is shown that a slight modification of the conditions employed by Arrow implies a spread of the dictate of one identity to its ‘incomplete parts’. The second result reveals that if one requires the decision making power to be spread a bit more equally across the various parts of a person’s identity, then even the derivation of an acyclic all-things-considered preference is rendered impossible. A third result shows that requiring some minimal consistency among a person’s plural identities, introduced via a domain restriction, allows the avoidance of the highlighted impossibilities. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Suggested Citation

  • C. Binder, 2014. "Plural identities and preference formation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(4), pages 959-976, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:42:y:2014:i:4:p:959-976
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-013-0761-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Guilhem Lecouteux & Ivan Mitrouchev, 2021. "The "View from Manywhere": Normative Economics with Context-Dependent Preferences," GREDEG Working Papers 2021-19, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    2. Guilhem Lecouteux & Ivan Mitrouchev, 2022. "Preference purification in behavioural welfare economics: an impossibility result," Working Papers hal-03791972, HAL.

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