Targeting and child poverty
AbstractWe examine the relative merits of targeting children within the household through price subsidies and cash transfers. To do so, we model the behavior of a household composed of one adult and one child. We then show that ‘favorable’ distortions from price subsidies may allow redistributing toward the child and then derive the conditions under which this redistributive scheme is more efficient than cash transfers. The framework is extended to account for possible paternalistic preferences of the social planner and for households composed of two adults with different preferences. Applied to a continuum of households, our approach is extended to the problem of child poverty alleviation. In contrast to the traditional view, we show that well-chosen subsidies may be more cost effective than cash transfers in reducing child poverty. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 39 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Olivier Bargain & Olivier Donni, 2011.
"Optimal Commodity Taxation and Redistribution within Households,"
201107, School Of Economics, University College Dublin.
- Bargain, Olivier & Donni, Olivier, 2011. "Optimal Commodity Taxation and Redistribution within Households," IZA Discussion Papers 5608, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Donni Olivier & Bargain Olivier, 2011. "Optimal Commodity Taxation and Redistribution within Households," THEMA Working Papers 2011-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Bargain, Olivier & Donni, Olivier, 2009.
"The Measurement of Child Costs: A Rothbarth-Type Method Consistent with Scale Economies,"
IZA Discussion Papers
4654, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Olivier Bargain & Olivier Donni, 2010. "The Measurement of Child Costs: A Rothbarth-Type Method Consistent with Scale Economies," Working Papers 201001, School Of Economics, University College Dublin.
- BARGAIN Olivier & DONNI Olivier, 2010. "The Measurement of Child Costs: A Rothbarth-Type Method Consistent with Scale Economies and Parents? Bargaining," CEPS/INSTEAD Working Paper Series 2010-30, CEPS/INSTEAD.
- Olivier Bargain & Olivier Donni & Prudence Kwenda, 2013. "Intrahousehold Distribution and Poverty: Evidence from Côte dIvoire," THEMA Working Papers 2013-23, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
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