Jury theorems with multiple alternatives
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 34 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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- Martinelli, Cesar, 2002.
"Convergence Results for Unanimous Voting,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
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- Wilson, Robert, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 511-18, October.
- Wit, Jorgen, 1998. "Rational Choice and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 364-376, February.
- Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1995.
"The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions,"
1147, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1997. "The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1247-1282, November.
- John Duggan & Cesar Martinelli, 1998.
"A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries,"
Wallis Working Papers
WP14, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- Peyton Young, 1995. "Optimal Voting Rules," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 51-64, Winter.
- Marcus Pivato, 2013.
"Voting rules as statistical estimators,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 581-630, February.
- Hummel, Patrick, 2011. "Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 1-6, July.
- Patrick Hummel, 2012. "Deliberation in large juries with diverse preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 595-608, March.
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