Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms

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Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms

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Hannu Vartiainen ()

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Hannu Vartiainen

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 29 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
Pages: 353-367
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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:29:y:2007:i:3:p:353-367

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Glazer, Jacob & Perry, Motty, 1996. "Virtual Implementation in Backwards Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 27-32, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jackson Matthew O. & Palfrey Thomas R. & Srivastava Sanjay, 1994. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 474-501, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Matthew, Jackson O. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay., 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanism," Working Papers 754, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
- Matthew O. Jackson, 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 966, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 997-1021, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Abreu, D. & Sen, A., 1989. "Virtual Implementation In Nash Equilibrium," Papers e-90-13, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Abreu, D. & Matsushima, H., 1991. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Incomplete Information," Papers e-91-2, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
- Abreu, D. & Matsushima, H., 1991. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Incomplete Information," Papers e-91-1, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
Bochet,Olivier, 2005. "Nash Implementation with Lottery Mechanisms," Research Memoranda 036, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- BOCHET, Olivier, 2005. "Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers 2005072, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
- Olivier Bochet, 2007. "Nash Implementation with Lottery Mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 111-125, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Jordi Massó & Antonio Nicolò, 2007. "Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Gregarious Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 714.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Massó, Jordi & Nicolò, Antonio, 2008. "Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 591-611, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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