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Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment

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Author Info
Arnaud Dellis ()
Mandar Oak ()

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Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-006-0203-2
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 29 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
Pages: 229-245
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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:29:y:2007:i:2:p:229-245

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  1. Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Dellis, Arnaud & Oak, Mandar P., 2006. "Approval voting with endogenous candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 47-76, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Messner, Matthias & Polborn, Mattias K., 2004. "Paying politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2423-2445, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Matthias Messner & Mattias Polborn, . "Paying Politicians," Working Papers 246, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Weber, Shlomo, 1992. "On Hierarchical Spatial Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(2), pages 407-25, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2008-8-31.

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