Equal rights to trade and mediate
AbstractAugust 1999 For economies with a fixed finite set of traders, few results characterize Walrasian equilibria by their social choice properties. Pareto efficient allocations typically require lump-sum transfers. Other characterizations based on the core or strategyproofness apply only when, as in continuum economies, agents cannot influence prices strategically. Or the results concern social choice with a variable number of agents. This paper considers allocations granting agents equal rights to choose net trade vectors within a convex cone and, in order to exclude autarky, an additional right to mediate mutually beneficial transactions. Under standard assumptions, these properties characterize Walrasian equilibria without transfers. JEL: Classifications: D63, D50
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 21 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Peter J. Hammond, 1999. "Equal Rights to Trade and Mediate," Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics 99019, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
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