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Stable sets and standards of behaviour

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Author Info

  • Robert Delver

    ()
    (Department of International Security Studies, Royal Netherlands Naval Academy PO Box 10.000, 1780 CA, Den Helder, The Netherlands)

  • Herman Monsuur

    ()
    (Department of International Security Studies, Royal Netherlands Naval Academy PO Box 10.000, 1780 CA, Den Helder, The Netherlands)

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    Abstract

    In this paper we present a constructive, behavioural and axiomatic approach to the notion of a stable set as a model of the standard of behaviour of a social organisation. The socially stable set we introduce is a generalisation of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. In contrast with the original version, our stability concept is always solvable. The standard of behaviour, reflecting the established conceptual order of a society or organisation, emerges from a dominance relation on alternative conceptions that are relevant with regard to a certain issue. This common social choice phenomenon, that permeates our societies and organisations, we have tried to clarify. Two axiomatic characterisations as well as a construction algorithm for socially stable sets are presented. These characterisations are based on behavioural postulates regarding the individual or collective strategic behaviour of effective sets. Relations between socially stable sets and other notions of stability are discussed.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

    Volume (Year): 18 (2001)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 555-570

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:3:p:555-570

    Note: Received: 4 May 1998/13 March 2000
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    Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm

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    Cited by:
    1. Peris, Josep E. & Subiza, Begoña, 2012. "M-stability: A reformulation of Von Neumann-Morgenstern stability," QM&ET Working Papers 12-4, Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica.
    2. Monsuur, Herman, 2005. "Characterizations of the 3-cycle count and backward length of a tournament," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 164(3), pages 778-784, August.
    3. Peris, Josep E. & Subiza, Begoña, 2013. "A reformulation of von Neumann–Morgenstern stability: m-stability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 51-55.

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