Uncovering some subtleties of the uncovered set: Social choice theory and distributive politics
AbstractAlthough the uncovered set has occupied a prominent role in social choice theory, its exact shape has never been determined in a general setting. This paper calculates the uncovered set when actors have pork barrel, or purely distributive, preferences, and shows that in this setting nearly the entire Pareto set is uncovered. The result casts doubt on the usefulness of the uncovered set as a general solution concept and suggests that to predict the distribution of political benefits one must explicitly model the institutions that structure collective choice.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 15 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Note: Received: 29 April 1993/Accepted: 28 June 1996
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- De Donner, P. & Hindriks, J., 2000.
"The Politics of Progressive Income Taxation with Incentive Effects,"
00-542, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- De Donder, Philippe & Hindriks, Jean, 2003. "The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2491-2505, October.
- DE DONDER, Philippe & HINDRIKS, Jean, . "The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1673, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Philippe De Donder & Jean Hindriks, 2000. "The Politics of Progressive Income Taxation with Incentive Effects," Working Papers 416, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
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