Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
AbstractWe deal with the implementation problem where agents in some groups can cooperate (or form coalitions) and in some others cannot. We consider a situation where the planner does not know whether agents in a group can cooperate or not. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a correspondence to be implementable in such a situation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 14 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Note: Received: 28 February 1995/Accepted: 13 March 1996
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- Yi, Jianxin, 2012. "Double implementation in Nash and M-Nash equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 105-107.
- Tian, Guoqiang, 2003. "A solution to the problem of consumption externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 831-847, November.
- Suh, Sang-Chul, 2001. "An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 103-110, January.
- Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 113-123, January.
- M. Puy, 2013.
"Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties,"
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Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 65-87, January.
- M. Socorro Puy, 2009. "Stable Coalition-Governments: The Case of Three Political Parties," Working Papers 2009-3, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
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