Social choice with procedural preferences
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 13 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
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- Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2002. "Strategic Power Revisited," CESifo Working Paper Series 736, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ritxar Arlegi & Dinko Dimitrov, 2004.
"On Procedural Freedom of Choice,"
Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de EconomÃa - Universidad PÃºblica de Navarra
0401, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
- Jobst Heitzig & Forest Simmons, 2012. "Some chance for consensus: voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 43-57, January.
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