The coalition of the willing: Effect of country diversity in an environmental treaty game
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal The Review of International Organizations.
Volume (Year): 5 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.springer.com/business/sociology/journal/11558
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
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