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Delegating divisible sovereignty: Sweeping a conceptual minefield

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  • David Lake

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  • David Lake, 2007. "Delegating divisible sovereignty: Sweeping a conceptual minefield," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 219-237, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:2:y:2007:i:3:p:219-237
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-007-9012-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-286, March.
    2. Martin, Lisa L. & Simmons, Beth A., 1998. "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 729-757, October.
    3. Pollack, Mark A., 2003. "The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199251179.
    4. Nielson, Daniel L. & Tierney, Michael J., 2003. "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 241-276, April.
    5. Ruggie, John Gerard, 1993. "Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 139-174, January.
    6. Lupia,Arthur & McCubbins,Mathew D., 1998. "The Democratic Dilemma," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521585934.
    7. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    8. Lupia,Arthur & McCubbins,Mathew D., 1998. "The Democratic Dilemma," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521584487.
    9. Henry Thompson, 2000. "International Markets," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: International Economics Global Markets and International Competition, chapter 1, pages 3-37, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    10. Katzenstein, Peter J. & Keohane, Robert O. & Krasner, Stephen D., 1998. "International Organization and the Study of World Politics," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 645-685, October.
    11. Wendt, Alexander, 1992. "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 391-425, April.
    12. Levy, Jack S., 1994. "Learning and foreign policy: sweeping a conceptual minefield," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 279-312, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Klaus H. Goetz & Ronny Patz & Eugénia Heldt & Henning Schmidtke, 2017. "Measuring the Empowerment of International Organizations: The Evolution of Financial and Staff Capabilities," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 8(s5), pages 51-61, August.
    2. Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, 2015. "Delegation and pooling in international organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 305-328, September.
    3. Tobias Lenz & Besir Ceka & Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks & Alexandr Burilkov, 2023. "Discovering cooperation: Endogenous change in international organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 631-666, October.
    4. repec:bla:glopol:v:8:y:2017:i::p:51-61 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Ondrej Hamulak, 2015. "Lessons from the "Constitutional Mythology" or How to Reconcile the Concepts of State with European Integration," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 2, pages 75-90, June.
    6. Kreuder-Sonnen, Christian & Zangl, Bernhard, 2015. "Which post-Westphalia? International organizations between constitutionalism and authoritarianism," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 21(3), pages 568-594.
    7. Markus Gastinger & Henning Schmidtke, 2023. "Measuring precision precisely: A dictionary-based measure of imprecision," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 553-571, July.
    8. Chris Humphrey, 2017. "He who pays the piper calls the tune: Credit rating agencies and multilateral development banks," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 281-306, June.
    9. Robert Brown, 2010. "Measuring Delegation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 141-175, June.
    10. Haggard, Stephan & Noland, Marcus, 2016. "Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements, and the Case of North Korea," MPRA Paper 105812, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Thomas Gehring & Linda Spielmann, 2023. "The treaty management organization established under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement: an international actor in its own right?," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 235-252, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereignty; International organizations; Principal-agent theory; Delegation; Pooling; F53; K33; H11;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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