Public goods provision: Unit-by-unit cost-sharing rules and the core
Abstract
In a simple model of one public good producible from one input, we show that unit-by-unit cost-sharing rules have two properties. First, a unit-by-unit cost-sharing rulealways chooses a core allocation. Second, every allocation in the core will be chosen by at least one unit-by-unit cost-shring rule. We argue that costs should be shared on a unit-by-unit basis. We propose a simple mechanism to implement the family of unit-by-unit rules. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.
Volume (Year): 9 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 363-376
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/index.htm
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Related research
Keywords: Public goods; cost-sharing; core;References
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Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Junnosuke Shino, 2012. "2x2 Delegation Games With Implementability In Weakly Undominated SPNE," Departmental Working Papers 201202, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
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