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Manipulation of the Walrasian mechanism in production economies with unbounded short-selling

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  • Laurence Kranich

Abstract

Hurwicz (1979) and Otani and Sicilian (1982, 1990) characterized the Nash equilibrium allocations of the Walrasian demand manipulation game in successively more general exchange environments. In this paper, I extend the analysis to production economies with short-selling. First, I generalize Hurwicz’s and Otani and Sicilian’s theorem that any allocation at which each agent’s consumption bundle lies above her true offer curve can be supported in Nash equilibrium. I then show that for finite economies of any size the set of such allocations is often topologically large. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005
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  • Laurence Kranich, 2005. "Manipulation of the Walrasian mechanism in production economies with unbounded short-selling," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 9(3), pages 289-305, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:9:y:2005:i:3:p:289-305
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-005-0131-0
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    Cited by:

    1. Yamamura, Hirofumi, 2016. "Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: An application of the minimax theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 48-57.

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