Up-front payment under RD rule
AbstractThis paper explores the effect of an up-front payment to contracts under the reliance damage measure. We find that the efficiency in most cases fails, but can be obtained by a high enough total payment to assume away the seller’s breach, a high enough up-front payment to ensure that the seller does not sue, and a high enough trading price to ensure the buyer’s breach when the undesirable state occurs. Edlin’s device (1996), which has a very low trading price to assume away the buyer’s breach and a proper up-front payment to entice the seller to sign, fails to achieve the efficiency under the reliance damage measure. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.
Volume (Year): 9 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (December)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/index.htm
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