original papers : Implementing optimal procurement auctions with exogenous quality
AbstractIn this paper, we consider the implementation of the optimal procurement auction outcome when there is a trade-off between price and quality for the buyer. The quality proposals of the competing firms are assumed to be exogenous and common knowledge. After defining the optimal auction, we characterize the discriminatory first score auction and the modified second score auction implementing it when the buyer is assumed to have the same information as the firms. Then we consider an auction which requires no specific information from the buyer and show that a second score auction followed by a negotiation stage can implement the optimal auction outcome under this more realistic assumption.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.
Volume (Year): 7 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Note: Received: 30 March 2001 / Accepted: 14 December 2001
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/index.htm
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
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