The not-so-secret-agent: Professional monitors, hierarchies and implementation
AbstractIt is well-known that, when agents in an organization possess private information that is unverifiable by an outside party, games where agents simply announce their information can have multiple equilibria that may impede the successful implementation of the organization's objectives. We show that the introduction of a professional monitor (e.g. auditor, regulator, supervisor) can help to destroy the "bad'' equilibria when agents have private information but have incomplete info rmation about others' information.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.
Volume (Year): 7 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Note: Received: 21 May 1998 / Accepted: 26 May 2000
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Baliga, S., 1995. "The Not-So-Secret Agent: Professional Monitors, Hierarchies and Implementation," Papers 201, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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