A study of proportionality and robustness in economies with a commonly owned technology
AbstractStudying one-input one-output economies, we say that an allocation is proportional if the input-output ratio is identical among agents and if each agent maximizes her welfare given this ratio. We propose three equity axioms based on this definition, and we use them to compare the main solutions to this simple equity problem. We also combine efficiency, robustness axioms and our proportionality axioms to characterize two solutions.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.
Volume (Year): 7 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Note: Received: 11 June 1997 / Accepted: 26 May 2000
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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- Olivier, BOCHET & François, MANIQUET, 2006.
"Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support,"
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