Impossibility of Nash implementation in two-person economies
AbstractIn this note, we prove two impossibility results of Nash implementation in two-person economies. First, we will show the non-existence of continuous and balanced mechanisms which implement the Walrasian correspondence. Second, by adding a convexity assumption of mechanisms, we present the impossibility of continuous implementation of Pareto optimal and individually rational allocations in balanced way.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.
Volume (Year): 3 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Note: Received: 16 April 1996 / Accepted: 25 April 1997
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/index.htm
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001.
"A crash course in implementation theory,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.