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Cooperative equilibria in fisheries: how many players?

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  • Rögnvaldur Hannesson

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Rögnvaldur Hannesson, 2008. "Cooperative equilibria in fisheries: how many players?," Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 61-76, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:lsprsc:v:1:y:2008:i:2:p:61-76
    DOI: 10.1007/s12076-008-0008-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hannesson, Rognvaldur, 1997. "Fishing as a Supergame," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 309-322, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fisheries economics; Shared fish stocks; Cooperative games; Q22; C71;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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