Premium differentiation in the Unemployment Insurance system and the demand for labor
AbstractWe simulate the effect of the introduction of premium differentiation (experience rating) in the Dutch Unemployment Insurance system on the demand for labor for a variety of sectors in the Dutch economy. For the simulations we use the Bentolila and Bertola (1990) framework as a point of departure. In the simulations, the introduction of experience rating is modeled as expenditure neutral: in the absence of premium differentiation the cost of financing UI is modeled as a wage tax (independent of the number of workers fired by the firm), whereas in the presence of experience rating this cost is attributed to firing cost (affected by the firing action). Thus, the introduction of experience rating results in a shift from wage cost to firing cost. Following the political debate on the issue in the Netherlands, we assume that the introduction of experience rating does neither lead to a change in tax rates paid by workers nor to a change in eligibility rules or replacement rates of benefit claimants. Specific attention is paid to the distinction between ‘young’ and ‘old’ workers . In the model, labor adjustment costs (hiring and firing costs) are linear. The model allows for uncertainty in the business cycle. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Population Economics.
Volume (Year): 17 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00148/index.htm
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Rob J.M. Alessie & Hans Bloemen, 2000. "Premium Differentiation in the Unemployment Insurance System and the Demand for Labor," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-020/3, Tinbergen Institute.
- Alessie, R.J.M. & Bloemen, H.G., 2000. "Premium Differentiation in the Unemployment Insurance System and the Demand for Labor," Discussion Paper 2000-11, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Alessie, Rob & Bloemen, Hans, 2000. "Premium differentiation in the unemployment insurance system and the demand for labor," Serie Research Memoranda 0002, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
- J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General
- J60 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - General
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bentolila, Samuel & Saint-Paul, Gilles, 1992. "The macroeconomic impact of flexible labor contracts, with an application to Spain," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 1013-1047, June.
- Bentolila, Samuel & Bertola, Giuseppe, 1990. "Firing Costs and Labour Demand: How Bad Is Eurosclerosis?," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 381-402, July.
- Giuseppe Bertola & Ricardo J. Caballero, 1993.
"Cross Sectional Efficiency and Labor Hoarding in an Matching Model of Unemployment,"
NBER Working Papers
4472, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bertola, Giuseppe & Caballero, Ricardo J, 1994. "Cross-Sectional Efficiency and Labour Hoarding in a Matching Model of Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 435-56, July.
- Holmlund, Bertil & Zetterberg, Johnny, 1991.
"Insider effects in wage determination : Evidence from five countries,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 1009-1034, July.
- Holmlund, B. & Zetterberg, J., 1989. "Insider Effects In Wage Determination: Evidence From Five Countries," Papers 1989a, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
- Dale T. Mortensen & Christopher A. Pissarides, 1993.
"Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment,"
CEP Discussion Papers
dp0110, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Mortensen, Dale T & Pissarides, Christopher A, 1994. "Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 397-415, July.
- Blanchflower, David G & Oswald, Andrew J, 1994. "Estimating a Wage Curve for Britain: 1973-90," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(426), pages 1025-43, September.
- Burda, Michael C., 1991. "Monopolistic competition, costs of adjustment, and the behavior of European manufacturing employment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 61-79, January.
- Topel, Robert H, 1983. "On Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 541-59, September.
- Graafland, J.J. & Huizinga, F.H., 1998. "Taxes and benefits in a non-linear wage equation," MPRA Paper 21076, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ruud de Mooij, 2004. "Towards efficient unemployment insurance in the Netherlands," CPB Memorandum 100, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.