Private transfers with incomplete information: A contribution to the "altruism-exchange motivation for transfers" debate
AbstractWe examine the role of altruism in determining optimal transfers from a principal (a mother) to selfish agents (her children) in return for attention services. Transfer-attention contracts are studied in a setting in which informational asymmetries arise from the inability of a parent to determine the extent of her children's selfishness. We find a predominating exchange motive for transfers in the symmetric informational regime we study. However, both altruism and exchange are important motives under asymmetric information. We show that altruism facilitates transfer-attention exchange arrangements with certain trade partners under incomplete information, but diminishes trade with others.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Population Economics.
Volume (Year): 15 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Note: Received: 19 November 2000/Accepted: 17 May 2001
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
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