The effect of divorce costs on marriage formation and dissolution
AbstractExploiting the theoretical parallels between the matching of workers to jobs in the labour market and the matching of individuals in the marriage market, we use a search theoretic model of marriage formation and dissolution to examine the effect of divorce costs on both decisions. By introducing learning at both stages of the marital decision process, we show that divorce costs not only affect the probability of divorce but also the probability of marriage. Interestingly, to what extent divorce costs affect the marital status distribution depends on the information regarding the quality of the potential marriage that individuals receive while encountering marital offers.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Population Economics.
Volume (Year): 12 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Note: Received: 30 July 1996/Accepted: 7 December 1998
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Other versions of this item:
- Spiros Bougheas & Yannis Georgellis, . "The Effect of Divorce Costs on Marriage Formation and Dissolution," Economics and Finance Discussion Papers 97-05, Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University.
- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
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- Mumcu, Ayse & Saglam, Ismail, 2006. "Marriage and Divorce in a Model of Matching," MPRA Paper 1907, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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