Are migrant minorities strategically self-selected?
AbstractIn this paper we focus on the possibility of migrants' self-selection through strategic remittances. We argue that migrants of a specific community might be pooled with migrants from other ethnic minorities on the labor market of the foreign host country and that this could reduce the occurrence of strategic remittances. In a simple model with two types of workers, skilled and unskilled, facing two possible actions, to migrate or not to migrate, we derive the theoretical conditions under which strategic transfers are still operating when pooling among communities is introduced. We then show through numerical illustrations that the case for strategic transfers is rather weak when using realistic values for the main parameters of the model.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Population Economics.
Volume (Year): 11 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Note: Received: 1 October 1997/Accepted: 7 April 1998
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
- J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
- J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
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- Bouoiyour, Jamal & Jellal, Mohamed & Wollf, François-Charles, 2003. "Effective Cost of Brain Drain," MPRA Paper 29176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Rapoport, Hillel & Docquier, Frederic, 2006.
"The Economics of Migrants' Remittances,"
Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism,
- Hagen-Zanker, Jessica, 2010. "Modest expectations: Causes and effects of migration on migrant households in source countries," MPRA Paper 29507, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Tigran A. Melkonyan & David A. Grigorian, 2008. "Microeconomic Implications of Remittances in an Overlapping Generations Model with Altruism and Self-Interest," IMF Working Papers 08/19, International Monetary Fund.
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