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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-009-0169-2
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Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 539-551

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:38:y:2009:i:4:p:539-551

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Related research

Keywords: Quantal response equilibrium; Trembling hand perfection; Entropy;

References

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1. Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps, 2010. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 415, David K. Levine.
   
   • Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M., 1993. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 320-367, July.
   • Fudenberg, D. & Kreps, D.M., 1992. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Working papers 92-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
2. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2000. "Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions," Virginia Economics Online Papers 345, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
   
   • Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 247-272, May.
   • Palfrey, Thomas R. & Goeree, Jacob & Holt, Charles, 2000. "Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-value Auctions," Working Papers 1073, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
3. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 373, David K. Levine.
   
   • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 547-73, May.
4. Lu, Haishu, 2007. "On the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(3), pages 459-462, March.
5. Anderson, Simon P. & Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 2001. "Minimum-Effort Coordination Games: Stochastic Potential and Logit Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 177-199, February.
6. Ed Hopkins, 2001. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000226, David K. Levine.
   
   • Ed Hopkins, 2002. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2141-2166, November.
   • Ed Hopkins, 2004. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," ESE Discussion Papers 51, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
   • Ed Hopkins, 2001. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 625018000000000226, www.najecon.org.
7. Thomas Palfrey, 2002. "Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private Value Auctions," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000089, UCLA Department of Economics.
8. Richard Mckelvey & Thomas Palfrey, 1998. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 9-41, June.

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