AbstractThis paper studies situations in which a project consisting of several activities is not executed as planned.It is divided into three parts.The first part analyzes the case where the activities may be delayed; this possibly induces a delay on the project as a whole with additional costs.Associated delayed project games are defined and are shown to have a nonempty core.The second part considers the case where the activities may be expedited; this possibly induces an expedition of the project as a whole creating profits. Corresponding expedited project games are introduced and are shown to be convex. The third and last part studies situations where some activities may be delayed and some activities may be expedited.Related project games are defined and shown to have a nonempty core.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 36 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Estevez Fernandez, M.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M., 2007. "Project games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-195640, Tilburg University.
- Estevez Fernandez, M.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M., 2005. "Project Games," Discussion Paper 2005-91, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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- Brânzei, R. & Ferrari, G. & Fragnelli, V. & Tijs, S.H., 2001.
"Two Approaches to the Problem of Sharing Delay Costs in Joint Projects,"
2001-22, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Brânzei, R. & Ferrari, G. & Fragnelli, V. & Tijs, S.H., 2002. "Two approaches to the problem of sharing delay costs in joint projects," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-91324, Tilburg University.
- Estevez Fernandez, M.A., 2008.
"A Game Theoretical Approach to Sharing Penalties and Rewards in Projects,"
2008-84, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Estévez-Fernández, Arantza, 2012. "A game theoretical approach to sharing penalties and rewards in projects," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 216(3), pages 647-657.
- Arantza Est�vez-Fern�ndez, 2009. "A Game Theoretical Approach to Sharing Penalties and Rewards in Projects," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-090/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- repec:dgr:uvatin:2009090 is not listed on IDEAS
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